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The way in which the social subjects take decisions, the interactions established between these, the web of 
social institutions and rules, the architecture of the power relationships between the various “points of 
social coagulation” have as a foundation a complex set of determinants, in which the “pure” economic 
factors have an important, but not unique role. 
Thus, this paper intends to draft a possible analytical framework, capable of allowing the stress of some 
existing connections between the cultural variables, the social actions and the role of the public power. 
Heavy indebted to OLSON and NOZICK, the starting point is made out by a version of the mandate 
theory, within the way in which society, as a whole, as well as its individual components, delegates a 
certain set of social responsibilities to the public authorities, based on some social utility functions, which 
include the characteristics of the dominant cultural model. 
Part I of the paper deals with the elements of the theoretical foundation, elements resumed by a set of 
critical postulates and a special definition of state as the dominant agency in a social space and also of 
the negotiation / parallel associations. Part II is an attempt to examine some empirical evidences in the 
favor of some results derived from this foundation.  
The main conclusion of the paper could be resumed by the idea that trying to describe the interactions 
between state and society without taking into the account the characteristics of the cultural paradigm is 
equivalent to talk about Hamlet without mentioning the prince of Denmark. 
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PART I: THE LOGIC 
 
The  way  in  which  the  social  subjects  take  decisions,  the  interactions  established 
between these, the web of social institutions and rules, the architecture of the power 
relationships between the various “points of social coagulation” have as a foundation a 
complex set of determinants, in which the “pure” economic factors have an important, 
but not unique role. The ideological structures, the social customs, the informal habits 
and  rules  configure a  decisional architecture,  which  is  far away  from  including  the 
reasons associated to the “maximization of utility”, in the “rational” meaning of this 
concept. Consequently, the “rational agent” stories contain “white spots” extended right 
in the central part of the set of constitutive hypotheses, even in the situations in which 
more  “realist”  approaches  are  followed,  based,  for  example,  on  a  certain  type  of 
bounded rationality. To fill these “spots”, besides the hard component of the description   2 
of  decisional  devices,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  consideration  the  soft  “non-
economical” factors. Within these, the cultural determinants of the social actions can be 
identified as “critical” factors, able to appear as economic mediators of the results of 
these actions. 
Thus, this paper intends to draft a possible analytical framework, capable of allowing 
the stress of some existing connections between the cultural variables, the social actions 
and the role of the public power. 
 
The starting point is made out by a version of the mandate theory, within the way in 
which society, as a whole, as well as its individual components, delegates a certain set 
of social responsibilities to the public authorities, based on some social utility functions, 
which include the characteristics of the dominant cultural model. 
Of course, such a starting point is far not to be criticized. The mandate theory has 
numerous  analytical  weaknesses,  and  under  certain  aspects,  it  is  lacking  “realism”. 
Nevertheless, for the objectives of this study, it offers a convenient framework, which 
allows a (self) consistent approach of the way society perceives the role practiced by 
public authorities and the way it authorizes this role. 
 
In short, the version of the mandate theory that we take into consideration is based on 
the following set of postulates: 
0 P : Every social subject is endowed with an identical set of “natural rights”, but with 
unequal abilities of exerting these; 
1 P : To maximize its utility derived from “its natural rights”, a social subject, X, can 
choose to delegate the exerting of a fraction, ￿, from this to another subject, Y, which 
has a superior ability of exerting the delegated rights, and, thus, to share with it a 
fraction c from the output generated by this exerting.  
 
Thus, the fundamental premise is that the social subjects are endowed with identical, 
generic and  undifferentiated “natural  rights”, but  they  have  abilities of non-uniform 
practice of these, because of their various native abilities, as well as of the conditions, 
within they practice these abilities. To maximize the utility derived from the possession 
of their rights, these subjects can consider as rational to delegate the exerting (but not 
the possession, which is inalienable) to other subjects, which have superior abilities in 
managing these. Their delegation happens in the situation in which the output obtained 
by  the  subject  X,  ( ) x ch   is  superior  to  that  generated  in  the  situation  in  which  he 
himself would practice the delegated rights ( ) ( ) x ch x g < . 
 
The fact can be noticed, that this premise contains at least one critical aspect, namely 
that the “natural rights” can be divided, and their exerting is able of being transmitted. 
Even without drawing up an ad-hoc list of these rights, it can be presumed, on a pure 
intuitive level, that such an assertion cannot be valid for the whole: only some “natural 
rights” can be practiced in a limited way and only for some the demise of their exerting 
to  another  social  subject  is  possible.  But  he  border  between  fractionable  and  non-
fractionable  rights, as well  as  of  those  who’s  exerting  can  be  transmitted  or  not  is 
“vague”, making up a “twilight zone”, which is unclear traced out. For example, one 
could consider the right to life and personal security preservation. In this case, we may 
consider that  the  social subject, which considers that  his abilities to  defend himself 
against the aggression of other subjects is not satisfactory, can choose to delegate the 
assurance  of  personal  protection  to  another  subject  Y  in  the  situation  in  which  the 
probability  to  be  protected  against  an  aggression  by  this  subject  is  superior  to  the 
probability of being able to protect yourself. Also, we may consider that within this   3 
delegation certain limits of threatening can be established, against which Y agrees to 
protect  X.  But  it  is  not  clear  enough,  in  an  ex-ante  manner,  the  way  and  the 
circumstances, in which Y can actually restrict his protecting action of X in case of a 
concrete aggression. 
 
If a conventional delimitation of the taxonomy of “natural rights” is accepted, we can 
distinguish the fact, that within each group of rights the output for the social subject X 
by the delegation of their exerting right is different: 
 
Because ( ) ( ) ( ) x g x ch ch - + > 1 , the maximal output for both social subjects takes place 
when the exerting of some non-fractionable rights is transmitted (or, alternatively, the 
complete transmission of exerting some fractionable rights). Consequently, the social 
subject X will tend to delegate the exerting right and, correlative, subject Y will tend to 
accept the taking over of the exerting for the complete “packages” of  “natural rights”, 
whose exerting can be transmitted. 
 
Furthermore, one can notice that except the “natural rights”, the social subjects also 
possess “achieved rights” namely that kind of rights, that do not intrinsically derive 
from  their  quality  of  human  beings,  but  which  other  social  subjects  accept  to 
acknowledge in exchange for recognizing their own rights of similar nature.   
More precisely, the distinction between “natural rights”, and “achieved rights” consists 
in the fact that, while the existence of the first ones cannot be (from an ethical point of 
view) a subject of social recognition, the existence of the latter ones depends on their 
social acceptance. For both categories of rights, the exerting way represents a subject of 
social conventions.  
 
Unlike the “natural rights, “the achieved rights”, socially recognized, can be alienated, 
and some of these rights can be transmitted and divided. Under these circumstances: 
2 P : A social subject X can decide the complete or partial delegation of exerting an 
achieved  right  towards  another  subject  Y  if  the  output  of  this  delegation ( ) x a ,  is 
superior to the highest of the results derived from exerting his own right  ( ) x b  and 
respectively,  giving  it  in  (together  with  the  corresponding  right  of  exerting)  for  a 
“price” ( ) x p , in exchange of a fraction d of the total resulted output. 
 
 “The achieved rights” can be treated within a similar taxonomy to that of “natural 
rights”.  Under  these  circumstances,  as  we  can  see  from  Figure  2,  due  to  the  fact 
that ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] x b x da da - + > 1 , both social subjects will prefer, at a certain given level of 
the corresponding “price”, the integral delegation of “achieved rights”.  
 
The fact has to be noticed that the act of delegation is being produced inter alia, under 
the circumstances in which X knows that Y has a superior ability of exerting its “natural 
and/or achieved rights”. Otherwise, it is possible for X to be obliged to look for, identify 
and  inform  himself  about  Y’s  abilities,  thus  appearing  supplementary 
“searching/informing” costs, which depend on the volume of rights, which practice is  
about to be transmitted ( ( ) x i ). It is also possible that the initiative of transmitting the 
exerting of some or other of X’s rights to be launched by a persuasive action of Y, 
action that is motivated by his desire to benefit from the combined output of exerting his 
own rights and also those taken from X, and which has associated costs dependent on 
the correspondent volume of rights, that make his object,  ( ) x e . So, the “net” output of 
delegating the exerting of “natural” rights, and the achieved ones, are, as in Figure 3.   4 
 
The transmission of exerting “natural” rights, and respectively, of the “achieved” ones, 
can take place within one mandate, more or less exactly formulated, and within X, as a 
principal and Y, as an agent establish the conditions and the limits of this exerting. 
So far, no special hypotheses have been made regarding Y’s behavior. Thus, it can be 
supposed that this can take into consideration the merger with another social subject Z, 
so as to obtain a superior output from the exerting of the delegated rights of X and/or 
from the takeover of exerting the rights of a greater number of social subjects. The logic 
of transmission by Y of a fraction or of a complete level of rights, whose exerting was 
taken  over  from  X  is  similar  to  the  one  described  before.  Supplementary,  the 
transmission by Y of a fraction f from the “natural” rights, whose exerting was taken 
over from X, or of a fraction m from those “achieved”, under the circumstances in 
which the output generated by their exerting by Z is equivalent to ( ) fx v / ( ) mx w  and also 
the acquiring by Y of some fractions o and r from this output, presupposes for the 
transmissible rights the minimal achievement of conditions derived in Figure 4. 
 
If Z agrees to this transmission
1, this one becomes the under-principal, and Y and Z 
constitute an agency of exerting the rights, specific to X. Of course, there is a possibility 
that this agency should have been established in a period of time former to its initial 
delegation, so as the implicated relationships should be established between X and the 
entity constituted by the two social subjects as a whole.  
 
The existence of a “large enough” number of subjects of the X type, for whom the 
transmission of the exerting of “natural” as well as “achieved” rights is profitable, leads 
to  the  two  sets  of  complementary  effects:  1)  the  growing  of  the  dimensions  of  the 
agency  specialized  in  this  exerting  and  2)  the  appearance  of  many  agencies,  that 
compete on the same territory. 
Depending  on  the  persuasion  costs  level,  there  is  a  possibility  that  between  these 
agencies cooperation  or  competitive  relationships  are  established.  Thus,  either  these 
agencies will merge, constituting a macro-agency, either one of these agencies absorbs 
or eliminate the other agencies, and has the monopoly of exerting the social subject’s 
rights in the action area. 
 
It is obvious that the two sets of effects lead to the appearance of some institutional 
costs (“organization costs”, as well as “coordination costs”),  ( ) a k , that is  ( ) b k  (where 
a  represents the number of members of an individual agency and  b  the number of 
associated agencies) which influence the dimension and the internal structure of  an 
agency, as well as the relationships between these. Therefore, we can assume that the 
growing in the number of the members of an agency induces a synergic modification of 
its  “production  function”  for  the  “natural  rights”,  which  becomes ( ) a w , x ,  or  to  be 
precise of the “achieved rights”,  ( ) a d , x . As well as, the foundation of “associations” 
between  diverse  agencies  lead  to  an  output  of  exerting  “natural  rights”,  which  is 
                                                
1 A critical aspect is the one of the consensus, which must obtain by Y from X to name Z as an under-
principal.  In  fact,  several situations  are possible:  1)  X  knows  about  Y’s  intention  to re-delegate  the 
exerting of his rights and a) Z is named as a potential under-principal, as well as b) the information is 
general,  without  the  precise  indication  of  Z,  situation  in  which  (i)X  can  accept  the  re-naming  and 
choosing of Z; (ii) X can accept the re-delegation but rejecting the nominalization of Z or (iii) Z can turn 
down the re-delegation and 2) X does not know about the re-delegation but Y proves the exerting of the 
mandate under the circumstances explicit stated in the mandate contract, submitting him the output or 
presenting the proof  of the „objective” conditions, which have prevented its realization. Under these 
circumstances, the requests that are on the base of the foundation of an agency between Y and Z as 
presented in Figure 4, are valid in the situations 1) (i) or 1) (ii).   5 
equivalent to  ( ) b j , x , and also leading to an output of the “achieved rights”  ( ) b , x W . 
The combined conditions for the existence of such an “association” between two or 
more agencies with a large number of individual members, exclusively seen through 
these, are presented in Figure 5. 
 
The formation of a macro-agency or of a dominant agency is not exclusively generated 
by the voluntary association of several individual agencies, which plan to maximize the 
resulted output by exerting the social subject’s rights from a certain territory. Thus, on 
the one hand, it is possible for these social subjects to request clearly the association of 
one individual agency with other agencies, in order to allow the partial or complete 
exerting of “natural” or “achieved” rights under the circumstances formally given in 
Figure 6. On the other hand, it is possible for an agency to resort to different forms of 
violence, practiced against competing agencies. In this case, the conditions given in 
Figure 5 must be correspondingly modified in order to reflect the costs associated to 
such an unfolding ( ( ) b a, w )
2.
 Finally, the foundation of macro-agencies or of dominant 
agencies can be the result of a “mixed policy”, partially characterized by the voluntary 
association with  other  agencies and partially through the unfolding of  some violent 
actions pointed against these (and / or their clients). 
Similarly, it is possible for an agency, a macro-agency or a dominant agency to resort 
to violence against its own clients, to determine these to increase the fraction of their 
rights, the exerting of which is transmitted towards the agency and/or against some 
unaffiliated social subjects, replacing in this way the persuasion costs with the specific 
ones,  ( ) b a, , x w .  
 
In short: 
0 D : The “state” represents the macro agency or the dominant agency of exerting the 
“natural” and the “achieved” rights, taken over from the social subjects from a certain 
territory,  and  formed  by  the  voluntary  association  of  several  individual  agencies 
through the “competitive” elimination of other agencies or as a consequence of some 
violent  actions  pointed  against  other  agencies,  their  clients  or  its  own  clients.  The 
exerting framework of the relationships between this agency and the social subjects 
constitutes the substance of the “social contract”. 
 
A critical aspect of defining the state as a micro-agency/a dominant agency in short 
agency – is highlighted by NOZICK (1997; p.65), who, debating the case of private 
associations  of  protection  (which,  under  certain  aspects,  can  be  seen  as  “particular 
cases” of agency) notes that “there are at least two ways in which “private associations” 
of protection could be considered as different from a minimum state and could not 
satisfy a minimal conception about the state:1) it seems to allow certain individuals to 
impose their own rights and 2) it seems that it doesn’t protect all the individuals within 
its own territory”. In other words, the agencies would not represent a form of state, 
because they don’t hold the monopoly of using the force in the geographical area where 
their action ray extends: in this area, there might be certain X social subjects who refuse 
to join an agency, because for those, the conditions from Figure 4 and/or Figure 6, are 
not satisfied and they choose to practice in a complete and individual way the “natural” 
and “achieved” rights. More than that, from an agency’s services benefit only those  
subjects who are willing to give up, one way or another, a certain fraction of the output 
of exerting their rights, without accepting that this giving up might be done in favor of 
other  subjects,  who  cannot  (or  will  not)  benefit  from  the  agency’s  services.  As  a 
                                                
2 In fact, the analysis should be detailed, taking into consideration the existence or the non-existence of 
the accept of the agency’s clients X for the unfolding of some violent actions against other agencies.   6 
consequence, an agency would not represent a state form due also to the fact that it 
would not be in right (from an “ethical” point of view) to act in a redistributive manner, 
by asking certain clients to pay for services offered to others. 
 
We  consider  that  an  answer  could  be  given  to  these  two  objections,  even  without 
referring  to  the  collateral  compulsives  doctrine  (the  rights  of  social  subject  1 X  
represent  “compulsions”  for  the  actions  in  which  the  social  subject  2 X   might  be 
involved;  2 X  can be stopped from committing actions that violate the “border” defined 
by  the  “natural”  rights  and,  probably  partially  by  those  “achieved”  or  could  be 
constrained to compensate the consequences of these actions. In this context, “the state” 
would represent that entity that would hold, in a certain social area, the institutional 
design’s  monopoly  for  the  prohibitions  and  compensations  system  involved  in 
respecting / violating the “borders” produced by certain categories of rights).  
 
Thus,  one  can  get  a  difference  between  the  absolute  and  relative  monopoly  over 
exerting rights by an agency: we can agree on understanding in a “relative sense” the 
dominancy of  an agency in exerting  the  rights of  social subjects in a certain area, 
within a “minimalist” definition of the state. More precisely, in the sense of “relative” 
dominancy, it is not absolutely necessary that the agency “would inform, that as much 
as  possible  (taking  into  considerations  the  costs,  the  efficiency,  the  most  important 
alternatives that it must achieve, and so on), will punish everyone will be proved to have 
used the force (or in this discussion’s definition, has got involved in exerting/violating 
its own clients rights) without its clear permission” (NOZICK (1997; p.66) and that 
because it does not have  the moral entitlement to do so, in order to represent a form of 
state. It is enough that the de facto situation of the agency, its position within the system 
of relations in a certain area and the force relations with the competitive entities, already 
made or potential ones, to be of a certain nature, that any violation of its monopoly 
would be only a limitative one, both as effects and temporally (notice that this kind of 
position avoids the above mentioned problem of  “moral justification”: the agency has 
gained  a  dominant  position  because  the  majority  of  the  social  subjects,  within  its 
geographical area has decided or were forced to decide (!) - to become its clients and 
because  it  has  “competitively”  or  though  violent  actions,  limited,  the  majority  of 
candidate agencies. 
 
Therefore, one way or another, the agency succeeded in representing the majority of 
social subjects – no matter how we define this “majority”. However, in no sense, from 
this situation results a moral non-factual justification for the violent actions the agency 
might undertake towards one social individual subject, that has not the quality of one of 
his clients, or even towards his own clients, or, differently said, there is no ethical base 
for proclaiming the dominant agency as “state”, by virtue of its position in regard of the 
social sphere. So, this position is tantamount to the aspiration that the dominant agency, 
although  it  is  not  legally  justified  to  consider  itself  a  form  of  state,  acts  and  is 
recognized as so. 
 
Also,  in  relation  to  any  social  subject 1 X ,  the  agency  may  pretend  to  act  in  a 
redistributive manner in order to prevent other social subjects attempt to deprive this 
subject of his „natural” or „achieved” rights. Thus, the existence of other non-members 
of the agency,  NM X  would generate, for its clients the risk of an attempt to get hold of 
the output of the exerting of their rights equivalent to a part 0 or the whole. If the cost 
beard by the agency for guarding/recuperating this output  ( ) NM , , x q L  are superior to 
the  preventive  compensation  that  the  agency  would  decide  to  pay  to  non-members   7 
because the output of their rights is inferior to that equivalent for its clients ( ( ) NM , x s )
3 
or if the recuperation, partial or integral, of the output achieved is not possible, then, it 




Thus, a modified definition D0 would be: 
1 D : „The state” represents the macro-agency or the dominant agency of exerting the 
„natural” or „achieved” rights, taken from the social subjects of a certain territory, 
formed  as  result  of  the  voluntary  association  of  individual  agencies,  through 
„competitive” elimination of other agencies or as a result of violent action against 
other  agencies  or  their  own  clients,  that  can  restrict,  as  effects  or  temporary,  any 
violation of its monopoly, by other entities, existing or virtual and which is authorized 
by its clients, in preventive aims, to act in a redistributive manner towards its non-
members.  The  frame  of  the  relations  between  this  agency  and  the  social  subjects 
constitutes the substance of the „social contract”. 
 
Despite this new definition, the selective character of the agency remains an „annoying” 
aspect: it gets its actions only in relation with its members, and with the non-members 
in a limitative way, within the redistributive, persuasive or constraint actions in order 
for these clients to obtain the quality of a client. Or, the, usual perception on the „state” 
is that its different services are (or, at least, should be affectively or potentially) offered 
to all the social subjects in the referred geographical area, and not to a part of these, 
even if that part represents the majority. 
 
A solution might be outlined by saying that the social subjects  1 X  sense an ethical 
disutility because of other excluded social subjects, voluntary or involuntary, from the 
position of agency clients, and also, that they consider that a preventive compensation 
can  only  have  a  partially  inner  character  (that  offering  a  compensation  for  all  the 
advantages resulting from membership quality is not possible), and also, a non-ethical 
one
5, taking into consideration that it may not be replaced by asking a lower price
6 for 
the agency’s services in relation to the non-members social subjects. 
Thus,  it  should  be  assumed  that  the  „utility  function”  of  1 X   subjects  includes 
utility/non-utility  derived  from  the  way  their  rights  are  practiced,  and  also,  the 
participation/non-participation of other social subjects to the fraction of the results of 
the agency’s activity. Or, at least, by intuition, it seems obvious that the introduction of 
this postulate generates all kind of difficulties. A „detour”, even partial, of these kinds 
of difficulties, can be done by an analysis taking into account the point of view of 
                                                
3 Compensation that the agency will recover from X1, by accordingly decreasing fractions c and d from 
the output of exercising its rights. 
4  In  fact,  the  conditions  for  x1’s  acceptance are  more  complex,  because  the agency  must  prove that 
redistributive actions are not only necessary, but also efficient, meaning that paying the compensation 
means  preventing  XNM’s  attempts  of  appropriation  for  the  output  of  exercising  their  rights.  Another 
subject of discussion is if establishing  the level and the way of distributing the compensation, can be put 
to the agency or if these must be accurately established by X1, and so on. 
 
5 In other words, to consider preventive compensation as ”cynical” by giving arguments that the necessity 
proceeds exclusively  from the forbidden character of the costs of the agency’s services, and in absence of 
such a character, the subjects XNM would rather achieve the quality of membership and not to attempt to 
appropriate, by violent actions, the output of exercising their rights. 
6 This means that at that level of cost to which the adhesion to the agency becomes unforbidden for XNM; 
the  difference  between  the  “normal”  cost  of  services  and  the  unforbidden  level  of  cost  should  be 
compensated  by subjects X1, because otherwise, this might seem unethical for the agency, and so on.   8 
subjects NM X . So, one can assume that these would accept to be paid in order not to 
ask  for  the  output  of  the  agency’s  activity,  if  the  conditions  in  Figure  8  are 
accomplished.  
 
According  to  those  the  fraction  from  the  direct  result  of  exerting  „natural”  and 
„achieved” rights, out of which the costs beard by the agency are deductible with the 
pay of preventive compensation, that can constitute, if the subjects  NM X  pay a part of 
the costs, and the agency pays for the actions of preservation / recuperation, the subject 
of the attempts of appropriation, taken by the non-members, represents the „minimum” 
level of preventive compensation that  NM X  are willing to accept in order to retain 
themselves from actions against the agency or its members. This level is a minimum 
one, because for „negligible” levels of the costs of violent actions against the agency’s 
clients, subjects  NM X  can take into consideration, integrally appropriating the output 
of exerting, either by the agency or the subjects 1 X , of their rights
7. 
 
Therefore, in accordance with the concrete level of the variables involved, the agency 
can  take  into  consideration  that  the  level  of  preventive  compensation  must  be  the 
equivalent of „standard” packaging of services offered to it s clients. 
It can be observed that the estimation of the preventive compensation is complicated by 
the existence of the "earned" rights. Therefore, in contrast to "natural" rights, these are 
"non-uniform" so that the output of their usage differs from a client to another. 
 
Consequently, the "right and efficient" fraction of the preventive compensation may 
vary a lot, from a "null" level to a "maximal" one ( ) ( ) b a d W , d . Furthermore, as it 
results from the manner in which these rights are defined, they represent a subject of 
social  recognition,  the  possibility  of  their  usage  being  critically  conditioned  by  this 
recognition. As a result, subjects  NM X  can ask directly to the agency or through the 
agency  to  subjects  1 X   to  be  remunerated  in  the  exchange  of  the  "earned"  rights 
recognition taken over by the agency and/or directly used by its clients. Therefore, it 
may be said that the level of the preventive compensation has two components: 1) A 
level due to the output of the "natural" rights presumed to be similar to the one that goes 
out to the clients; 2) A level due to the output of the "earned" rights that may/may not be 
the same with the "standard" level from which the clients benefit of. 
All these reasons can lead to an extension of the sphere of services offered by the 
company beneficiaries to overall social subjects from its reference geographical space, 
no matter if they have or do not have a client statute. This issues the problem of defining 
the relations between the agency, its clients and the non-members, in other words of the 
"social contract" based on which the conditions and limits of the agency' s actions are 
established. 
 
Even  a  not  very  detailed  analysis  of  this  contract  can  easily  show  the  difficulties 
encountered in its interpretation. 
A first observation is the fact that any contract implies a clear statement of the free will 
agreement between the parts involved. 
                                                
7 This concerns the situations when delegating rights afferent to the protection against certain violent 
actions and the results of such actions towards the agency are lacking or have only a partial character. To 
notice that in these cases, the initiative of redistributive actions does not come from the agency, but from 
the X1 subjects.   9 
But, from the way in which we described the build up of the agency it results that: 1) 
For some social subjects it has a unilateral character (as it is generated only by the will 
of the agency); 2) It is not mandatory explicit for all parts involved. More precisely, in 
definition  1 D   is presumed that some of the agency' s clients are "recruited" as a result 
of a violent action made by the agency or that they may become the subjects of such an 
action after they earn the client statute. Also, from the presentation of the agency' s 
manner of involvement in relations with non-members does not result the way in which 
the rights and obligations between parts are being established. If this short come can be 
resolved by the agency's decision to formalize its relations with the non-members, by 
taking over the institutionalization costs, costs that can also be recuperated from the 
clients, the first difficulty generates a "strong" restriction it the way of dealing with 
relationships  between  the  agency  and  its  clients  and  non-members,  as  "contractual" 
relationships. 
 
Therefore, from the way the agency is build up results a "mix" of relationships between 
it  and  its  clients.  If  for  “older”  clients  from  the  initial  stages  of  this  build  up 
predominate relationships made up by the free will agreement of both parts, the agency 
being an agent (a warrantee) of those in the common sense of the term, for some of the 
"new"  clients,  that  were  "taken  over"  from  other  agencies  or  which  have  been  the 
subject of compelling measures in order to give up one or more of their rights, the 
established  relationships  can  no  longer  be  described  in  the  common  sense  of  the 
mandate. Also, this description is no longer adequate for relationships established with 
the non-members that benefit from the preventive compensation. 
 
A second observation that must be taken into consideration is that, no matter of the 
shades of the "social contract" interpretation, the latter seems to have a nonspecific and 
generic character and not a personalized and specific one, as the "mandate contract" 
presents itself. In this way, "the state" and "the citizens" take upon themselves a set of 
obligations, an ensemble of generic rights and not ones specific in "quantity terms" as 
one would expect to appear between the social subjects X and the agency. Also, as far as 
the agency is concerned we can not discuss about a single "contract", but of a bunch of 
contracts concluded separately with each client. Of course, one may presume that once 
the agency reaches a certain development stage it will start using a standard "contract", 
in which the rights and obligations are stated in a uniform manner, with the purpose of 
minimizing the negotiating  costs.  Furthermore, if the preventive  compensation  were 
equal to a “standard services package”, it would be possible for the agency to offer this 
contract to non-members, too, in order to "systemize" its relationships with them. An 
issue that still remains open is the problem of the mechanism through which, as the 
agency grows and strengthens its market position, this contract becomes more and more 
general and non-specific. 
 
A third observation is linked to the fact that the changing of the variables involved in 
the  positioning  of  the  individual  social  subjects  towards  the  agency  determinates  a 
potential "instability" of the development conditions of the relationships in which the 
agency  is  involved  in,  and,  consequently,  it  generates  a  more  or  less  frequent 
"renegotiation" of the individual contracts from which, it may derive the "standard" 
contract offered by the agency. This case is valid not only for the use of the "earned" 
rights, but also for the use of the "natural" ones. Thus, the latter are "unchanging", it 
may be presumed that, with the growth of abilities and improvement of the means the 
components of the agency posses, its "production function" is changing and, together 
with it, the volume, structure and the quality of the output of the "natural rights" usage.   10 
Therefore, a "long" term stability of "contractual conditions" is slightly plausible: to 
presume the agency' s capability to stabilize once it has reached a "critical dimension", 
the social macro-dynamic is not enough to derive "the contractual stability conditions" 
especially  as  long  as  the  "production  conditions"  are  subject  to  considerable  and 
accelerated  changes.  In  other  words,  the  "economic"  interpretation  of  the  "social 
contract", the interpretation according to which this comes from the wish to maximize 
the output of their rights'  usage by a specializes agency is vulnerable in front of the 
observation  that  the  social  and  economic  "dynamic"  have  unequal  rhythms  and, 
therefore, if the agency is seen as a "services provider" subject which, in a way or 
another receives a material quantification, then the claim for it to be considered a "state" 
is  more  that  questionable.  This  last  observation  requires  a  more  detailed  analysis. 
Therefore,  if  we admit that the  agency' s  and  social  subjects'  "production  functions" 
change in time, then the agency can, as a result of the monopoly position occupied, to 
refuse  to  change  the  "social  contract"  in  the  current  period
8  1 t   compared  with  the 
previous period  0 t , at least as long as the conditions from Figure 9 are fulfilled: if in 
relative terms, the social subjects do not register a smaller utility in the current period by 
delegating towards the agency a greater usage of their rights then in the past period, then 
they can accept the keeping of the "contractual conditions" belonging to the previous 
period. 
 
These observations have a minimal character. The majority of the different objections 
which can be formulated in connection with the interpretation of the ,,social contract” 
underline the fact that, to the analysis presented here, the thesis stipulating the following 
is critical: along with the growth of the dimensions of the agency and of the number of 
social  subjects  with  which  it  comes  into  contact,  a  process  of  “standardization”  of 
individual contracts and the creation of a ,,basic contract” offered to clients takes place, 
in order to minimize the negotiation costs. Thus, the agreement does not focus primarily 
on  the  negotiation  of  the  contract  but  on  the acceptance  of  the  uniform  “clauses”. 
Gaining  membership in  the  agency  is  no  longer  a  result  of  the  process  of  contract 
negotiation but of a process of adherence. 
Furthermore, if the relations with non-members are institutionalized by the agency, then 
the contract derived from these relations becomes a component of the “basic contract” 
related to clients. 
 
Thus,  using  this  interpretation  of  the  social  contract,  this  is  a”conglomerate”  of 
standardized  contracts,  which  represents  the  basis  for  the  relationship  between  the 
agency and the entire community of social subjects within its referential geographic 
area. The “conglomerate” character of the social contract derives from the fact that it 
contains clauses specific to the relations with non-members which affect the agency’s 
relations  with  its  clients  (as  for  example  the  “provisions”  linked  to  preventive 
compensation) as well as, from a symmetric perspective, “clauses” related to customers, 
with consequences which bear influence upon the way of structuring relations with non-
members (as those linked to defining the ”standard set” of services exerting  “natural 
rights”). 
In consequence,  1 D  can be rephrased as follows: 
2 D ”The State” represents the macro-agency or the dominant agency of exerting the 
”natural” rights or of the “achieved” ones, taken from the social subjects of a certain 
territory, formed through voluntary association of a number of individual agencies, by 
“competitive” elimination of other agencies or as a result of violent actions directed 
                                                
8 "The current period" is defined in a conventional manner, being "long enough" so that the changing of 
the "production functions" become perceptible.   11 
against  other agencies, their clients, or its own clients, which can limit, as effects and 
on a  temporary basis, any breaking of its monopoly by other agencies, already existing 
or virtual ones, and which is authorized by its clients, in preventive purposes to act in a 
redistributive  manner  towards  non-members.  The  framework,  in which the  relations 
between the agency and the social subjects take place, forms the very essence of “the 
social  contract”.  This  derives  from  the  standardization  of  the  individual  contract 
negotiated  with  clients  and  non-members  which  represent  a  “conglomerate”  of 
contracts  containing  symmetrical  clauses  and  non-symmetrical  ones  which  include 
“provisions” linked to preventive compensation and to the “standard set” of services 
offered for the exertion of “natural rights”, respectively, “non-standard sets” related to 
the exertion of “obtained rights”. 
 
The presentation manner used so far was an asymmetrical one, the perspective being 
presented prevalent from the point of view of the agency, whereas clients and non-
members  have  a passive role after the conclusion of  their contracts. However, it is 
obvious that there are no sufficient arguments to see things this way. Thus one can 
notice that the fraction which corresponds to clients from the exertion by the agency of 
their “natural rights”, respectively of the “obtained ones”, depends, inter alia, of the 
fraction  between  the  number  of  these  clients  and  the  dimension  of  the  agency’s 
personnel,  of  the  number  of  associated  agencies  within  this  one,  as  well  as  of  the 
number of non-members. As the number of clients is bigger compared to the number of 
the  agency’s  employees  and/or  as  the  dominant  agency  is  made  up  of  agencies  of 
smaller  dimensions,  the  more  its  negotiating  capacity  (including  the  possibility  of 
engaging in acts of violence against its own clients) is reduced. This statement has to be 
cautiously analyzed: the growth of the number of the agency’s employees sustains the 
mechanisms of dominating the clients but at the same time, it leads towards the growth 
of different types of institutional costs.  
 
Surpassing a certain critical threshold of the agency’s personnel leads to a decrease in 
the fraction of the output which remains at its disposal, and at the same time there is a 
decrease in unitary output which belongs to each member of the agency (see Figure 
10)
9.  
At  the  same  time  the  number  of  non-members  bears an  indirect  influence  over  the 
relations  between  the  agency  and  its  clients.  In  this  way,  these  non-members  can 
become  the  target  of  some  persuasive/violent  acts  of  the  agency  and/or  its  clients, 
especially during the times in which the opposed character of their positions becomes 
more acute. On one hand the agency may try to replace the “disturbed” clients, by 
recruiting new ones from the non-members. On the other hand the ”captive” clients may 
try to  develop strategic alliances with non-members,  either to push the agency into 
accepting the renegotiation of an aspect or another of the “social contract”, or in order to 
impose the a new one to be drawn. Also, the clients may try to associate themselves 
with non-members in exerting their rights outside the specific, institutional frame of the 
agency. 
The aspects mentioned so far underline one of the severe limitations of the analysis. 
More precisely the description of the way in which the agency is formed, is only half 
the story. 
There is no reason sufficient enough in order to make the assumption that both the 
clients as well as the non-members do not get organized, either to obtain a superior 
capacity of negotiation in their contact with the agency, either to develop a parallel 
system of forces outside the space defined by it. 
                                                
9 Which explains, inter alia, the selective behaviour of birocrats when recruiting personnel, behaviour 
which is more visible in the periods of their consolidation   12 
 
In consequence, the framework of delegation should be completed with an association 
model. The logical basis of such a model is still far from being clear. Thus, even at a 
superficial approach, one can argue that the problem of describing the processes of 
client and/or non-member association is similar to that of the “prisoner’s dilemma”. An 
individual  social  subject  1 X   will  adhere  to  a  negotiation  association / parallel 
association (briefly association) if the supplementary fraction ( d , c D D ) gained through 
this  adherence  will  compensate  the”participation  costs”.  These  costs  are  made  of 
”search / information costs”( ( ) t , x i  where  t represents the number of members of a 
certain  association,  respectively  ( ) i t, , x i   for  the  participation  in  a  federation  of  i  
associations), the fraction F  from the institutional costs ( ( ) ( ) i t , k k ) at this subject’s 
expense, as well as the possible costs associated with a sanction imposed by the agency 
for this participation  ( ) i t J , , x ). 
 
One can notice the fact that these costs significantly depend upon a number of social 
subjects involved( ) i t, . Thus, it is presumed that initially the growth in number of the 
members of an association leads to a growth in probability of obtaining a favorable 
response from the agency in changing / completing a particular aspect of the ”social 
contract” (the case of changing it entirely makes up a different subject). 
This statement does not belong, in spite of appearances, to the area of ”evidence”: in the 
analyzed framework the reasons for which an agency confronted with a large number of 
clients who insistently ask for the renegotiation of one clause or another would actually 
do so, do not result in a direct manner. 
 
Besides the option of a violent rejection, the agency can simply say “no” without having 
to enter any negotiations in order to justify itself in front of its clients. Due to the 
monopoly it detains as well as a result of the fact that leaving the agency and joining an 
association will result in a loss of utility for the client, these members do not have too 
many options in case they are faced with a rejection. 
A possible option might be, according to some, not to delegate the possibility to exert 
the  right  in  dispute  to  the  agency,  but  rather  exerting  it  in  private,  as  part  of  an 
association- alone or together with individual or collective entities. However, two issues 
need to be clarified: 1) How can a client unilaterally renounce its initial delegation; 2) In 
what way can the association assure/organize for its members the exerting of their rights 
outside the institutional framework of the agency. 
 
It is unlikely that the agency would allow this without imposing a sanction ( ) i t, , x u ) on 
its members (as long as the cost  ( ) i t y , , x  of applying this is inferior to the fraction of 
output lost by the agency). 
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as a result of this delegation. 
 
 
Thus, clients will choose to exert their rights extra-territorially, outside the agency only 
if the gained output surplus will exceed the costs of renouncing the delegation of the 
rights as well as the penalties imposed  ( ) i t x , , x  (see Figure 11). 
In addition, there is no ex-ante reason to assume that the association can assure that a 
larger output will result from exerting one’s rights through it (except for the probability 
that its institutional costs will be lower than those of the agency and the lack of costs 
associated with the preventive compensations). The association does not dispose of the 
personnel  or  the  resources  of  the  agency  (if  it  would  do  so,  it  would  turn  into  a 
competing agency, fact that is not possible in the chosen analytical framework). 
It is notable that, if the conditions of Figure 11 are fulfilled, such a situation might arise. 
In some cases the lower institutional costs of the association and the absence of having 
to pay preventive compensations might be regarded as a comparative advantage. 
 
One must also take into consideration, that associations are smaller in dimension/size 
than the agency. This can lead to the fact that the unitary output gained by the individual 
social  participants  will  be  greater  than  the  output  received  through  the  agency. 
Furthermore, if these participants do not exceed in size a certain limit beyond which 
they would appear as competing agencies, the agency can choose not to impose any 
sanctions  or  penalties  on  its  clients  and  not  to  take  any  violent  actions  against  the 
association. 
As  a  result  of  these  facts  (the  cost  of  imposing  sanctions  and  penalties  and  the 
possibility that clients can choose to exert their rights in parallel systems) the agency 
that does not wish to act against its participants/members will be forced to renegotiate 
the contract and introduce changes to it. The agency is only willing to negotiate until its 
output, diminished by the part that will go to the clients, will stay superior to the loss of 
utility  determined  by  imposing  sanctions/penalties  and  by  the  clients  exerting  their 
rights as members of associations. 
 
It is obvious the participants that take part in negotiations have asymmetrical reasons to 
do so. Thus, the agency will only negotiate if the cost of not doing so will prove to be 
prohibitive.  Taking  in  consideration  other  reasons  would  mean  introducing  new 
hypothesis to describe the utility functions of the agency’s personnel, hypothesis that 
would justify the implementation/the choice of the agency for a “benevolent” behavior 
by submitting itself to its clients wishes, as well as introducing conditions under which 
the agency would support the costs of denying to negotiate in exchange for a favorable 
social appreciation of the role/importance its personnel has. To put it otherwise, the 
agency is likely to be reserved/ is likely to show some reticence towards engaging in 
negotiations. 
 
Associations, however, are easier to convince to negotiate the redistribution of a part of 
the  agency’s  output  in  favor  of  their  members.  In  explaining  the  behavior  of 
associations,  the  similarities  and  differences  between  negotiating  associations  and 
parallel  associations  must  not  be  ignored.  The  first  group  consists  of  coalitions  of   14 
(re)distribution. The participants of the second group engage in activities that lead to the 
increase of the global output that could be distributed among the members and are thus 
coalitions of production.  
 
The distinction between the two categories is not radical. Negotiations in both cases 
concern  certain  stipulations  whose  modification  can  lead  to  the  increase  of  the 
efficiency of the way the members exert their rights, modifications that influence at the 
same time the process of drawing up a model of the contract offered to customers. 
In order to protect their members’ interests, associations have two options: to make sure 
the members’ rights are exerted with a greater efficiency or to obtain a greater piece of 
the output that result from this process. 
As Olson [1999] states: “the organization can serve its members either by making sure 
that the social pie gets bigger, so that the members will get a bigger share even if 
proportions are taken into consideration, or, to obtain a bigger piece of the social pie for 
its members”. 
 
The best policy depends, inter alia, on the association scale. If the association has few 
members, the global output of their activity will be smaller and accordingly, the unitary 
output that will fall on each member will represent only a small part of the social output. 
On the other hand, once the number of members is growing, so does the output, both 
globally and per unit, until a “critical point” is reached, beyond which the result per unit 
will tend to decrease. As a consequence, for “extreme” values of the members’ number, 
the associations will tend to act as (re)distribution coalitions, while for medial values 
they will adopt the behavior of production coalitions (or, even more truth-like, mixed 
politics,  (re-distribution/production)(see  Figure  13).  If  the  initial  number  of  an 
association is small, it won’t have the power to negotiate with the agency and won’t be 
able to organize in an appropriate manner the parallel fulfillment of its members’ rights. 
As a consequence, both the outcome of its actions and the revenue per member would 
be less significant. Later on, once the number of members is growing, the negotiation 
capability would increase (and within this capability, the chance to protect the members 
of the possible punishing actions of the agency), and also the control over the social 
resources that may be involved in fulfilling the rights of those who form the association. 
But going beyond a certain “critical point” will have as a consequence that, for a lot of 
reasons (among them one can underline the significant increase of the institutional costs 
required by its functioning), in spite the growth of the global volume of the activities’ 
output, the outcome obtained by participating to an association would have a decreasing 
tendency. As a consequent, the logic that may be applied when estimating the optimal 
dimensions of the agency remains valid in the case of the associations (furthermore, 
concerning these latter there is  an additional restriction of  a maximum level of the 
members’ number, beyond this level they may appear in the situation of competing 
agencies for the dominant agency).  
 
The social output will grow if the predominant associations will have a medium size, 
“big enough” to negotiate with the agency and/or to ensure that the variety of parallel 
rights will  be fulfilled, and “small enough” in order to justify the efficiency of the 
participation by the resulting output per member. It is to be noticed that the existence of 
an optimal dimension for the associations is something that cannot be guaranteed a 
priori.  Therefore  these  associations  may  have  initially  the  goal  of  parallel 
renegotiation/fulfillment of a single right or of a limited number of rights of a small 
group of social subjects. If the “external conditions”, mainly including the way in which 
the agency reacts about their existence, are favorable, these associations will enter a 
consolidation/expansion process towards the “critical point” zone (the case in which the   15 
dimensions  grow  beyond  this  zone  requires  a  separate  analysis),  taking  over  an 
increasing number of rights from an increasing number of social subjects.  
 
The evolution of the associations imitates, to a certain degree, the dynamics of the 
agency.  These  may  associate,  under  federative  or  centralized  forms,  within  the 
framework of diverse macro-associations, and may attempt to eliminate each other, in 
“competitive” or violent manners
10. There is no reason to presume that the agency won’t 
interfere with the associations’ connections (except for the case where the interests of 
its clients are affected by an individual association). On the contrary, it is very likely 
that the agency might permanently interfere with the associations, either by developing 
strategic alliances with the latter ones, either taking action against them in order prevent 
them to become rival agencies. 
 
It is to be noticed that these components tend to produce unequal effects and, as a 
consequent, we can presume that  the  impact  upon the creation of the agencies and 
associations and upon the relationships developed between them is a distinct one. Thus, 
the ideological coagulation leads to the creation of negotiation associations, while the 
motivational heterogeneity influences the creation of parallel associations. The higher 
the  level  of    ideological  coagulation  (a  greater  number  of  social  subjects  share  a 
common vision concerning the main aspects related to the functioning of the society), 
the higher the probability of their association in order to change one or another of the 
“social  contract’s”  “clauses”.  In  correlation  with  this,  the  more  complex  the  social 
subjects’  motivations  are,  the  smaller  is  the  probability  of  their  inclusion  in  the 
institutional and functional framework of the agency, and therefore and the higher is the 
probability of appearance of some specialized parallel associations. In the same time, 
the two components of the intra-cultural heterogeneity influence the dimension and the 
efficiency  of  the  associations.  Therefore,  the  associations  will  tend  to  have  more 
reduced dimensions and, at the same time, increasing homogeneity, within the societies 
having greater paradigmatic heterogeneity, as a consequence of the fact that, on one 
hand, fewer individuals having the same vision about the ways of their fulfillment will 
be capable to associate. On the other hand, considering the selection possibilities of the 
various pressure groups, the individuals  might choose  to become members of those 
groups that have a maximum fondness with.  
All mentioned aspects underline the fact that the associations’ existence modifies the 
social space in which the agency acts, fact that imposes a change in D2: 
D3:  “The  state”  represents  the  macro-agency  or  the  dominant  agency  of  exerting 
“natural” and “achieved” rights, overtaken from social subjects from certain territory, 
formed by voluntary association of a number of individual agencies or as a result of 
some violent actions against other agencies, against their clients or against own clients, 
which could limit by effects and temporarily any breaking of its monopoly by other 
existing or virtual entities, and which is authorized by its clients, for preventive goals, to 
action in a re-distributive manner for the non-members. The framework in which the 
relations between this agency and the social subjects take place forms the substance of 
“social  contract”.  This  derives  from  the  standardization  of  individual  contracts 
negotiated  with  clients  and  non-members,  which  represents  a  “conglomerate”  of 
contracts including symmetrical and non-symmetrical “clauses” in relation with the 
preventive compensation and the “standard packages” of services offered for exerting 
of  the  “natural  rights”,  respectively  “non-standard  packages”  for  exerting  the 
                                                
10  The  possibility  that  the  agency allows  an  association  to  undertake  violent  actions  against  another 
association must analyzed in two distinct cases, taking into consideration the fact that the association, 
which represents the target of the aggression, is or not formed mainly by the clients of the agency.   16 
“achieved  rights”.  For  the  renegotiation  of  some  individual  clauses  of  the  “social 
contract” or for the parallel exerting of some of their rights, the clients and/or non-
members could group in negotiation associations / parallel associations which have a 
optimal social scale in a zone defined by the necessity of assuring the negotiating power 
/ the control on a “sufficient” fraction of the social resources, and by the necessity of 
the preservation of the efficiency of the participation for its members, and of the choice 
for a competitive / non-competitive position in respect to the dominant agency. The 
ensemble of strategic alliances / force relations between the agency and the macro-
associations or individual association defines the social space’s frontier. 
 
To show clearer what the role of the associations is, we have to underline the fact that 
from the agency existence it does not results “natural rights”, supplementary in rapport 
with  those  of  the  clients  and  non-members  but  that  distinct  “achieved  rights“  may 
appear. NOZICK(1997;p.134) writes: “the legal powers of a protection agency are only 
the  sum  of  their  individual  rights  which  its  members  or  clients  transfer  to  the 
association. No new right and power appear; each right of the association dissolves 
completely into the individual rights owned by distinct individuals, which act solely in a 
natural state. A mixture of individuals may have the right to accomplish an action C, 
which no other single individual would have the right to accomplish, if C is identical 
with D and E and if it is produced an association of the individuals who have the right to 
do / make D and E. If some of the individuals’ rights would be of the form “You have 
the right to do A, if 51% or 85% or any other percentage of the others agree with you”, 
then an association of individuals would have the right to make / do A, even if none 
would have this right separately. But none of the individuals’ rights has this form”. 
According to the terms used in the proposed analysis, this argument is available for the 
“natural rights”: the perfect identity of these rights for all social subjects does not allow 
the appearance of such rights distinct from those which are specific to an individual 
social subject. Though, what is changed due to the agency’s existence is the way of 
exercising of the “natural rights”: the existence of the agreement of will of a “great 
enough number” of social subjects is not a reason for the existence of an action A, even 
if this reason exists, then it may legitimate the manner in which this action takes place. 
At the same time, the actions performed by the agency when exercising the “natural 
rights” of its clients, are not from an ethical point of view, opposable against them or 
against the non-members: by its simple existence, the agency cannot offer automatic 
legitimacy to the way in which it acts, because there is no guarantee that this way is not 
a “wrong” one (that the manner chosen by the agency to fulfill the “social contract” 
does not harm the clients’ or the non-members’ capacity of exercising all their “natural 
rights” including of those whose exercise was not an object of the delegation). Even if 
we would suppose that all subjects from a certain social space, except one, agrees with 
the agency’s actions, these do not become opposable against this “exceptional” social 
subject: from an ethic point of view, the subject having the right not to agree with those 
action that harm his capacity of exerting his own rights. The main argument is that the 
right of each social subject to exerting these rights belongs to the category of “natural 
rights” (even it were not be true, the “natural rights” would be “virtual rights”
11 and 
there would be no legitimacy of the delegations that helped that the agency appears) 
and,  in  consequence,  its  negation  is  a  violation  of  P0:  the  right  to  try  to  exercise 
efficiently the “natural rights” is a “natural right”. Also, the agency has no right to ask 
the  exclusive  exerting  of  all  “natural  rights”,  even  if  these  are  transmissible  and 
fractionable (the fact that this may desire such a monopole on the basis of the dominant 
position lacks an ethical basis). In conclusion, the agency’s existence is not a “sufficient 
                                                
11 This means, the social subjects rights which represent for them a de jure entitlement, but which is not 
possible to have a de facto materialization.   17 
basis”  to  exclude  the  private  exercise  of  “the  natural  rights”  and  of  the  opposition 
towards those actions that affect this exercise. 
 
The situation is more complicated in the case in which the “achieved rights”: not only 
their exerting, but also their existence is the subject of the social recognition (we avoid 
here the problem of the social subjects number necessary to recognize the individual 
“achieved rights” and we believe that this number must be “significant”). In the case of 
their exercising, the agency  has the right to perform an action A, even if its clients do 
not benefit of such a right (have not obtained the agreement of a number “great enough” 
of  social subjects in  this sense), even if  it  has been previously authorized by these 
clients. In conclusion, the agency’s actions performed to exert the “achieved rights” 
which were delegated are from an ethical point of view against the third parties and may 
constitute a subject of the social negotiations. Because the agency is large, its clients, 
representing “most” social subjects, the agency has the right to refuse some individual 
clients or non-members to exert some “ achieved rights“ or even to refuse to recognize 
such rights
12. 
So, the agency as a principal for its clients, may express their acceptance or refusal to 
recognize  some  “achieved  rights”  and  also  the  connection  between  them  and  the 
agencies and may regulate the conditions of the performance of their actions. There is 
no guarantee, of course, that can be given before to the clients for the fact that this 
acceptance / refusal, and the corresponding regulations are automatically accepted by 
the  associations.  The  agency  may  often  be  forced  /  obliged  to  impose  on  the 
associations to accept / refuse other associations to exert the “achieved rights” of their 
members, either to adopt the regulations for their actions, and also to stop the formation 
of  some  associations  which  were  not  accepted  by  their  clients,  paying  the  costs  of 
“acceptance / regulation”, and those of “non-conformist” associations, “sanctioning“, l 
(￿,  ￿).  The  non-members  may  also  address  the  agency  for  the  negotiation  of  the 
“achieved rights” and their exertion, the agency being the one which supports the costs, 
n (Xl, ￿, ￿). This fact generates a positional asymmetry in the process of negotiation, the 
clients being able to refuse some “achieved rights” or their exertion, even if these are 
ethically legitimated, or to impose conditions for their exertion that may be unfair or 
regarded as an excessive constraint for the associations members. 
It results that: 
D4 : “The state” represents the macro-agency or the dominant agency of exerting 
“natural” and “achieved” rights, overtaken from social subjects from certain territory, 
formed by voluntary association of a number of individual agencies or as a result of 
some violent actions against other agencies, against their clients or against own clients, 
which could limit by effects and temporarily any breaking of its monopoly by other 
existing or virtual entities, and which is authorized by its clients, for preventive goals, to 
action in a re-distributive manner for the non-members. The framework in which the 
relations between this agency and the social subjects take place forms the substance of 
“social  contract”.  This  derives  from  the  standardization  of  individual  contracts 
negotiated  with  clients  and  non-members,  which  represents  a  “conglomerate”  of 
contracts including symmetrical and non-symmetrical “clauses” in relation with the 
                                                
12 We have to say that we consider the right to recognize an “achieved right” as a “natural right”: every 
social subject X1 is entitled to recognize / to refuse to another social subject X2 a right that it is not a 
“natural  right”  and  to  specify  the  conditions  in  which  she  accepts  its  exerting,  when  this  exerting 
interferes with her own “natural rights” (a relevant exercise for clarifying this point of view is to remark, 
for example, the fact that the right to perform an economic activity which generates pollution interfere 
with  the  ones  affected  “natural  right”  of  preserving  their  own  life  and  their  physical  integrity,  by 
consequence, they are entitled to permit the performing of these activities only to a point in which the 
benefits directly derived by them exceed the cost associated to the restriction of the adequate  possibilities 
of exerting this right).   18 
preventive compensation and the “standard packages” of services offered for exerting 
of  the  “natural  rights”,  respectively  “non-standard  packages”  for  exerting  the 
“achieved  rights”.  For  the  renegotiation  of  some  individual  clauses  of  the  “social 
contract” or for the parallel exerting of some of their rights, the clients and/or non-
members could group in negotiation associations / parallel associations which have a 
optimal social scale in a zone defined by the necessity of assuring the negotiating power 
/ the control on a “sufficient” fraction of the social resources, and by the necessity of 
the preservation of the efficiency of the participation for its members, and of the choice 
for a competitive / non-competitive position in respect to the dominant agency. The 
existence of these associations is ethically justified if their object of activity is connected 
with the exertion of the “natural rights’ and represents a subject of social recognition 
both by the agency’s clients, directly or through it, and by the non-members, which, 
ethically speaking, could  accept or refuse  their  existence if the object of activity  is 
related with the exertion of “achieved rights” and which could state the conditions of 
their action performing. The ensemble of strategic alliances / force relations between 
the agency and the macro- associations or individual association defines the social 
space’s frontier. 
Another significant argument in favor of the existence of the associations results from 
the situation of the subjects born in a social space dominated by a mature agency, with 
an institutional structure well developed and which accomplished the standardization of 
the “social contract”: there is no reason to believe that the parameters of the “functions 
of utility” are the same with those of the agency founders. From a multigenerational 
point of view, the conditions of stability from Figure 9 become even more acute. A 
logical question is about the clauses of the “social contract” of the new generations, 
such as: what could be the reason for which the new social subjects would have to 
respect these clauses for whose negotiation they did not take part? And what would 
force the new personnel of the agency to become responsible for the obligations of the 
old members? 
The problem is that for the new generations the agency’s existence is a given social 
reality:  the  agencies  may  survive  long  periods  of  time,  accepting  to  modify  “their 
manner  of  production”  and  the  way  of  exercising  their  obligations  following  the 
changing of the social conditions. In fact, except the cases when they are the victim of 
some violent actions performed by other agencies, by non-members or by their own 
clients or when they prove an “excessive adaptability”, these represent the most stable 
social structures. Or, taking into consideration this fact, we have to underline that within 
the  proposed  analytical  framework  there  is  no  satisfactory  solution  to  explain  this 
“multigenerational persistence” of agencies: the mandate theory cannot, without being 
severely modified, explain the fact that the activity of the in charge principal entity does 
not stop once they (and their personnel) disappear physically. Instead, a “transmission 
process”  take  place, from  the  new  generations  of  clients  to  the  new  generations  of 
personnel of the agency, even if without a re-negotiation of the “social contract” for 
each generation, (this is like treating the agency as an “inheritance” – an “optimal” 
framework  to  exert  the  “natural  rights”  and  the  “acquired  rights”  which  the  “old” 
generations transmit to the young generations who beneficiate from their own “natural / 
acquired” rights).  
 
In this context, we have to state the fact that an individual social subject, confronted 
with the existence of an agency at which formation he did not contribute, has not the 
possibility, in an isolate way to modify the way of its functioning (being able only to 
accept the quality of non-member) and the clauses of the “social contract”. This is thus 
obliged to sign a “social contract” already written. If its content is not satisfactory, his 
only solution is that of associating with other social subjects to form an association of   19 
negotiation / a parallel association, by which they have the capacity of correcting the 
mistakes. The necessity of forming a new association is not absolute: like the agencies, 
the associations may be capable of multigenerational survival (e.g. “…an organization 
founded to help the war veterans will survive them representing the veterans of the 
following wars” – OLSON (1999: 66). Thus, the new generations of social subjects may 
adhere to the associations already founded, modifying the way they function. 
 
It results: 
D5:  “The  state”  represents  the  macro-agency  or  the  dominant  agency  of  exerting 
“natural” and “achieved” rights, overtaken from social subjects from certain territory, 
formed by voluntary association of a number of individual agencies or as a result of 
some violent actions against other agencies, against their clients or against own clients, 
which could limit by effects and temporarily any breaking of its monopoly by other 
existing or virtual entities, and which is authorized by its clients, for preventive goals, to 
action in a re-distributive manner for the non-members. The framework in which the 
relations between this agency and the social subjects take place forms the substance of 
“social  contract”.  This  derives  from  the  standardization  of  individual  contracts 
negotiated  with  clients  and  non-members,  which  represents  a  “conglomerate”  of 
contracts including symmetrical and non-symmetrical “clauses” in relation with the 
preventive compensation and the “standard packages” of services offered for exerting 
of  the  “natural  rights”,  respectively  “non-standard  packages”  for  exerting  the 
“achieved rights”. ”. For the renegotiation of some individual clauses of the “social 
contract” or for the parallel exerting of some of their rights, the clients and/or non-
members could group in negotiation associations / parallel associations which have a 
optimal social scale in a zone defined by the necessity of assuring the negotiating power 
/ the control on a “sufficient” fraction of the social resources, and by the necessity of 
the preservation of the efficiency of the participation for its members, and of the choice 
for a competitive / non-competitive position in respect to the dominant agency. The 
existence of these associations is ethically justified if their object of activity is connected 
with the exertion of the “natural rights’ and represents a subject of social recognition 
both by the agency’s clients, directly or through it, and by the non-members, which, 
ethically speaking, could  accept or refuse  their  existence if the object of activity  is 
related with the exertion of “achieved rights” and which could state the conditions of 
their action performing. The ensemble of strategic alliances / force relations between 
the  agency  and  the macro-associations  or  individual  association  defines  the  social 
space’s frontier. For the social subject from the new generation, the agency appears as 
a given reality, they having the possibility to join the standardized “social contract”, to 
choose for the non-member state, and to form new associations and to participate to 
existing  associations,  founded  by  the  past  generations,  for  the  renegotiating  of  the 
clauses that are not corresponding anymore to the new specific social context. 
 
As a synthesis, the main thesis of the proposed analysis is the following: from the non-
uniformity  of  the  capacity  of  social  subjects  to  exert  their  “natural  rights”  and 
“achieved rights” one could derives sets of processes of exertion delegation, processes 
which generate, using “visible / invisible hand” mechanisms, a dominant agency in a 
referential social-geographical space, agency that has the capacity of intergenerational 
transmission / adaptation of its own structures and that owns the monopoly of forming a 
“conglomerate” of standardized contracts, which represents the “social contract”. The 
relations between this agency and the associations formed by the clients or by the non-
members for re-negotiation of some clauses of the “social contract” / parallel exerting 
of their members rights form the substance of the social space. 
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The next step of this analysis is to develop a possible approach of the cultural variables 
impact  on  the  agency’s  and  the  associations’  emerging  process,  on  the  individual 
contracts’ negotiation process, and on the social contract’s re-negotiation. 
P2: The emerging form of the agency and of the associations, the standardization of the 
clauses of the “social contract”, and the modality of the re-negotiation of these clauses, 
depend, in caeteris paribus conditions, on dominant “cultural paradigm” architecture 
of the respective social space. 
D6:  Through  paradigm  we  understand  the  dominant  collective  mental  model  that 
individualizes a society from another. This paradigm represents a societal integration 
factor, by offering common values and goals for the members of the society. Also, this 
represents the subject of some learning and inter-generational transmission process, 
which slowly modifies itself, in “long cycles”. 
 
The  paradigm  and  the  agencies/associations  generated  by  this,  influences  in  a 
significant manner the dynamic of the social-economic activity. So, it is sufficient to 
remark  that economic subjects are guided by the decisions taken  in the production, 
repartition and consumption processes, determined by a set of characteristic values, and 
that the economic policy is influenced in its interventions in the resources and economic 
activity results distribution and redistribution processes by the these values (e. g. the 
predominant  position  regarding  the  “equality  /  inequality”  couple  influences  in  a 
significant  way  the  agency’s  implication  in  the  income  redistribution  between  the 
different sort of social categories). 
 
In  the  same  time,  the  social-economic  development  influences  the  agencies  /  the 
associations,  and  also,  the  paradigm.  For  example,  the  significantly  bureaucratic 
institutions  which  had  characterized  the  industrial  society  have  encountered  an 
important decline in the postindustrial society. This has to be connected with the fact 
that this kind of society is characterized by the existence of a labor force which is very 
specialized, with a high mobility and which is focused on qualitative aspects of social 
life, as a result of fulfillment of its “quantitative” aspects, fulfillment determined by an 
increase in the per-capita income and by a reasonable (within “common sense” limits) 
equal distribution of these incomes. Also, the “real” socialist system dissolution has 
taken place, inter alia, in a maximal point of bureaucratic inefficiency in the centralized 
economy management. 
It is necessary to remark the fact that it is not clear enough the way in which the social-
economic  dynamic  influences  the  evolution  of  the  paradigm  and  the  agencies/the 
associations generated by it, if we take into account the different degree of inertia which 
characterizes its dynamic and, respectively, the dynamic of the economy. So, as we 
mentioned before, the paradigm has, by definition, an accentuated inertial character, 
which is more significant then the economic dynamic’s one.  
 
Although, because the cultural variables are assimilated, in an important proportion, 
through a “learning process”, it is possible to appear some intra-generational changes 
(probably, in “normal conditions”, first at an institutional level and, then, inside the 
paradigm), as a result of the evolving state of the economy between the moment of 
social debut of a generation and the one of its social “maturity”. More exactly, if we 
admit so called “scarcity hypothesis”, that states that the highest subjective utility level 
is assigned to the good which has a excessive demand, then satisfying the demand for a 
good “A” (which has an very low demand at the beginning of the cultural “learning 
process”) and the apparition of an exceeding demand for a good “B” during this process 
could generate a shift from the values assigned to the good “A” to the these assigned to   21 
the  good  “B”  (e.g.  from  “material  goods”  to  “spear  time”)  (see  also INGLEHART 
[1997], who consider this process as a shift from materialism to post materialism). 
 
Figure 14 presents the interactions between the paradigm, the institutions and the social-
economic performance. This presents a lot of similarities with the one presented by 
JONG  [2001,  p.41],  except  two  fundamental  differences:  (i)  the  usage  of  the 
“paradigm”  notion  instead  of  “cultural  values”  (justified  in  our  opinion  by  the 
distinction between the “strong” meaning of the first notion as a “mental model” and the 
meaning of “shared attitudes” suggested by the second notion); (ii) taking into account 
of a feedback relation between institutions and the paradigm (in the sense that, if an 
institutional  system  emerges  in  an  exogenous  way,  it  could  end  by  influencing  the 
receptive paradigm – the arguments for and against this thesis could be synthesized 
according to a specific approach of a recurrent theme  in the Romanian culture: the 
“forms without a content” theory – the initial creation of some institutional “forms” 
which are maintained in an “efficient” functioning ends by influencing the “content” 
that has not generated them, but only has received them).  
 
It is interesting to remark the possibility of creating equivalence between the paradigm 
components  and  the  factors  used  by  HOFSTEDE  (1980)
13  to  explain  the  cultural 
differences (using some limitation in their sphere and content).These factors are
14 : 
￿   Power Distance (PD); 
￿  Individualism (I); 
￿  Masculinity (M); 
￿  Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). 
 
PD deals with the degree of acceptance of the non-equal power distribution in society. 
In the societies with a higher level of PD, this distribution will have a more pronounced 
character, with a positive correlation between this factor and the concentration of the 
political power (HOFSTEDE (1980; p.97-98,106))
15. 
 
In societies characterized by a high UAI level, the refuse of decisional incertitude will 
generate an increased recurs to the public authorities for its dispersion and orientation to 
a  minimum  level;  as  a  consequence,  the  power  and  competences  sphere  of  these 
authorities will be larger and more precisely established than in those societies with a 
low  UAI  level,  which  will  accentuate  the  individual  competences  of  the  economic 
subjects and the limitation of the public role to a small set of public utilities supply. 
 
M does not imply the discrimination of the cultural values on sexes, trying to reflect 
some  fundamental  values  shared  by  all  society  members.  More  precisely,  it  is 
considered  that  the  “masculine”  societies  are  those  where  the  dominant  values  are 
connected with the social affirmation, the material results and the decisional freedom. In 
this  conditions  the  performance  is  measured  using  the  terms  of  reaching  and 
maintaining  a  reference  social  status  and  the  material  achievements  are  considered 
more important that the spiritual ones. In opposition, the “feminine” societies have as 
dominant  values:  the  equality,  the  solidarity  and  the  consensus,  the  social  tension 
                                                
13 Realized in 1968-1973 starting from approximately 66 non-socialist countries, this study collected 
information from more than 117000 forms, completed by the IBM employees in this countries  
14  For  this  analyzes  purposes, the  main  advantage  in  using  these factors is  the  quantification  of  the 
relevant elements, which could be used, in an empirical approach of the mentioned thesis.  The factors 
interpretation realized here is larger that the one strictly derived from this study. 
15 PD is formal definite as follows: “ the distance between a superior B and a subordinate S in a 
hierarchies represent the difference between the measure  B can determine S behavior and the measure S 
can determinate B behavior” (HOFSTEDE[1980 ;p.22]).   22 
avoidance, the centralization of the social-economic trades and the conservation or the 
spiritual values, tided to the “quality of life” and to the inter-human relationships. 
 
Finally, I deal with the acceptance/rejections of the individual responsibilities in front of 
the social reference group (family, social category, nation) 
Discussion of the relevance and the limits of these concepts exceed this paper framework.  
 
We consider that taking them into consideration and using them to characterize three types 
of paradigm, characteristic for three types of societies, could be useful (see Figure 15): 
￿  “X” society  (closed society); 
￿  "Y" society (semi-opened society); 
￿  “Z" society (opened society). 
 
Closed societies are characterized by the tendency (at least formal shown) of attenuation 
at the unequal power distribution level, by a pronounced collectivism, by promoting the 
“feminine  “values  (searching  for  consensus  and  not  for  competition)  and  by  a 
pronounced incertitude and risk aversion. 
 
In semi-opened societies all these parameters have medium values; the opened societies 
valorize more the acceptance of the unequal power distribution, as “natural” status, the 
individualism and the social affirmation, the performance and the material result, the 
incertitude acceptance as a status, which could generate action opportunities. 
 
These cultural variables influence, minimally: 
·  the “level” and the “intensity” of the delegation processes; 
·  the emerging process of the agencies and associations; 
·  the standardization manner of the “social contract” “clauses”; 
·  the social negotiations processes. 
In the society with a high level of PD, the delegation process to the agency is seen as a 
“natural” process and the inequality between the exerting capacities of different rights is 
pregnant  pointed  out.  Also  the  violent  acts  oriented  to  other  concurrent  agencies 
represent an important part in the mechanisms of agency creation. The associations 
have a reduced negotiating power, their structure is similar in a way if we look at the 
hierarchic  -authority  structure  with  the  structure  of  the  agency  and  the 
penalties/sanctions imposed by the agency concerning the participation to the former 
ones  could  be  substantial.  “The  social  contract”  is  formed  by  rigid  standardized 
“clauses”  and  their  renegotiation  is  not  simulated  .The  social  status  plays  a  very 
important role in the negotiation processes between the agency and their clients, the 
agency and the associations, and not in the last place between clients and non-members. 
 
Also, if the level of UAI is very high, the social subjects will be tempted, in a significant 
way, to delegate their rights’ exertion, having as a purpose the social dispersion of the 
involved risks. The agency is seen as a “safety structure” that has as the main role the 
creation of a “safe” social environment. In the creation mechanisms the action of non-
conflict negotiation will be predominant. The associations will have large dimensions, the 
connections  between  themselves  and  between  them  and  the  agency  will  have  the 
configuration of a “safety network”. The standardization of the “social contract” will be 
manifested  in  a  large  number  of  “detailed”  and  precisely  formalized  “clauses”.  The 
processes of social negotiation will have a large consensual character and will involve 
many “social compromises” which have as a major role the avoidance of the eventual 
violent actions of the parts which could consider them self disadvantaged (inter alia, the 
level of preventive compensation  will be higher then in the societies with a smaller UAI).   23 
 
In the societies with a high level of M, the accent on the individual achievement will 
have an adverse effect to the delegation process: the social subjects will prefer to exert 
themselves a higher volume of rights. This will affect also the transmitting process of 
“natural rights” and “achieved rights” exertion. The dominant agency will be created 
especially through the competitive elimination of the other agencies, the associations 
will be in a significant way parallels associations and will be entitled with selections 
mechanisms which choose the members based on their “individual merits”. Between 
them  are  established  more  competitive  relations  and  less  cooperation relations.  The 
“social contract” will be standardized “in a flexible way” and with a small number of 
formalized “clauses” concerning the social performance. The social negotiations could 
have a strong adverse character, the consensus being more an exception then a rule. 
 
In a similar way, for a high level of I, the social subjects will prefer, in a reduced 
degree, to delegate the exerting of their rights, the agency will have a reduced number 
of employees. In its forming are involved, in a way or in another, a small number of 
concurrent agencies, the associations will be prevalent in a position of some concurrent 
parallel associations with small/medium dimensions. “The social contract” will include 
a minimal number of “clauses”, the one referring to the preservation of the individual 
liberty being especially formalized.  The frequency of the social negotiations will be 
more reduced, and this will often have a conflict character.  
 
Resuming: 
P3: “From the left to right “of the societal spectrum (from closed to opened societies) 
could be seen a reduction in the “level” and the “intensity” of the delegation processes 
in  the  exercitation  of  the  “natural  rights”  and  also  the  “achieved”  ones,  some 
mechanisms of creating agencies based  on “competitive” elimination, a dimensions 
reductions  of  the  associations  and  a  predominance  of  the  parallel  associations 
comparing  with  the  negotiations  ones.  Also  one  could  notice  a  decrease  in  the 
preventive compensation level, a reduced standardization of the “social contract” and 
a special formalization of the “clauses” connected to the social performance and the 
preservation of the social subjects’ liberties, a crossing from the social negotiations 
based on consensus to the “competitive” social negotiations. 
 
 Meantime, the social space’s configuration is influenced not only by the level but also 
by the heterogeneity of the cultural values. From AU [2000] point of view the defining 
variable of the intra-cultural heterogeneity could be grouped in less than two categories: 
1) the ideological heterogeneity (“ideology variation”) and motivational heterogeneity 
(“satisfaction  variable”).  The  ideological  heterogeneity  reflects  those  intra-cultural 
heterogeneity determinants leaded to the economic freedom as the public sector role, 
the competition and the processes involved by social assets forming. The ideological 
heterogeneity refers to a complex of economic-social factors. These variables tend to be 
“positively “inter - correlated. Between the medium evaluations level of the cultural 
competition significance and the role of the public sector could be established “positive 
“or  “negative”  correlations  but.  If  the  economic-social  subjects  share  heterogenic 
cultural values regarding the competition they will be tempted to share also heterogenic 
values regarding the public sector. The relations established between the medium levels 
of the cultural values do not correspond necessarily to the relations established between 
the elements that define the intra-cultural heterogeneity (and vice versa). 
 
We  have  to  remark  that  these components  tend  to exercise  un-uniform  effects and, 
because of that, we could presume the fact that the impact on the way of forming of the   24 
agents and the agencies and on the relations between them is a distinct one. So, the 
ideological  coagulation  leads  to  forming  of  some  negotiation  agencies  and  the 
motivational heterogeneity influences the way of forming of parallel associations. As 
higher is the level of ideological coagulation (as a larger number of social subjects 
share a common vision on the main aspects about how society works) as higher is the 
probability of their association for modifying one or another of the “social contract” 
“clauses”. Correlatively, as complex are the motivations of social subjects as lower is 
the probability to be incorporated in the institutional and functional framework of the 
agency,  and,  by  consequence,  as  higher  is  the  probability  of  apparition  of  some 
specialized parallel agencies. In the same time, the two components of intra-cultural 
heterogeneity influence the dimension and the efficiency of the associations. So, the 
associations tend to have smaller dimensions and a higher homogeneity in societies 
with higher paradigmatic heterogeneity. On one hand, this is a consequence of the fact 
that a smaller number of individuals who share the same objectives and have a common 
perspective on the way of reaching these objectives will be able to associate. On the 
other hand, considering the selection possibilities of more various pressure groups, the 
social subjects could choose to become members of the group which they have the 
maximal cultural affinity.  
 
In  the  same  time,  as  lower  is  the  intra-cultural  heterogeneity  as  easier  the  diverse 
concurrent agencies will merge and form a dominant agency, and as easier will be the 
standardization of the social contract an more stable will be its initial formulation. 
This thesis must be interpreted with care: it is not clear enough an a priori proclamation 
of a significant connection between the intra-cultural heterogeneity and the dimension 
and  other  characteristics  of  agency  and  associations.  The  historical  nature  of  these 
entities, the concrete circumstances of their forming, the “social pressure” which shaped 
them,  the  structure  of  their  “production functions”,  and  the  resources  that  could  be 
engaged in the social (re)distribution process, all that exercise significant formative and 
structural  influences.  So,  the  preceding  remarks  must  be  interpreted  as  “caeteris 
paribus” formulations: if all others parameters are the same, the associations and the 
agencies  from  two  social  spaces  will  be  different,  as  a consequence  of  their  intra-
cultural heterogeneity. 
Even more, it is not clear enough the correlation between the degree of social openness 
and  intra-cultural  heterogeneity.  So,  it  could  be  considered  that  an  accentuated 
paradigmatic  heterogeneity  tends  to  contribute  to  the  raising  of  openness  degree, 
especially by accentuating the un-uniform reactions of the social subjects relative to the 
existence and functioning of the agencies and associations: as more the social subjects 
react distinctively, as more difficult is for these entities to determine a standardized and 
predictable social climate, and harder is to exercise a constant influence on that climate. 
So: 
P4: In caeteris paribus conditions, the dynamic of two distinct social spaces it will be 
differentiated  by  intra-cultural  heterogeneity  which  characterize  their  paradigmatic 
configuration: as higher is this heterogeneity, as more the forming and evolution of the 
agencies will be prevalent dominated by actions of “competitive elimination” / violent 
actions, as smaller will be the associations and higher will be both their homogeneity 
and  the  degree  of  social  openness.  More,  as  higher  will  be  the  relative  level  of 
ideological heterogeneity, as lower will be both the number and the relative impact of 
negotiation associations. 
 
One  of  critical  aspects  for  this  argumentation  is  that  a  higher  intra-cultural 
heterogeneity will stimulate the forming of “small dimension” groups. The intuition 
behind this thesis is relatively simple. On the one hand, the individual social subjects   25 
will tend to associate with other subjects, which share the same common values that 
have “the same way of thinking”. On the other hand, any institutional entity tends to 
develop  its  own  “subculture”.  Or,  its  formation  is  more  facile  in  small  dimensions 
entities,  which  could  easier  generate  the  specific  “mélange”  between  its  members’ 
values and behaviors. Also, this kind of cultural homogenous associations can adopt 
more easily a “niche strategy”, inserting themselves on specific social segments, and 
transmitting an “institutional image” which permits their individualization in a distinct 
manner. Despite these relative institutional advantages, it is not sure enough that the 
associations formed in social spaces with a high degree of intra-cultural heterogeneity 
have  an  intrinsic  social  efficiency.  So,  one  of  the  limiting  factors  of  this  kind  of 
efficiency is represented by the consensual nature of the decisions taken: because of the 
homogeneity of the values shared, it is possible that this kind of associations to have a 
weak hierarchical structure, and the decision making process to be orientated towards a 
wide  agreement  between  members.  By  consequence,  between  institutional  costs 
generated by an association functioning, very important are the costs of obtaining a 
consensus (“intra-institutional costs”). More, this kind of associations will try to satisfy 
in the best way possible the members’ interests, so that these will have a busy agenda, 
with not necessary subordinated and/or convergent objectives. And, if the idea that this 
kind  of  associations  are  principally  negotiation  associations  is  a  valid  one,  this 
“overcrowded  agenda”  will  limit  their  negotiation  capacity  with  the  agency  and, 
correlatively, will limit the fraction of the social output that they could distribute to their 
members.  
 
By consequence, it could be formulated a sub-proposition for P4: 
P4: In caeteris paribus conditions, the dynamic of the associations from two distinct 
social  spaces  will  be  differentiated  by  the  intra-cultural  heterogeneity  that 
characterizes  their  paradigmatic  configuration:  as  reduced  is  this  heterogeneity,  as 
larger will be the number of small dimension associations, which will try to satisfy a 
wide range of their members’ interests, having in this way an “overcrowded” agenda, 
and for which the costs of obtaining a consensus represents an important share of 
institutional costs.  
The  effects  of  intra-cultural  heterogeneity  on  associations  are  transmitted  through 
associations  themselves  on  the  agencies,  which  represents  a  second  “transmission 
channel” except the direct effects one. The main reason of existence of this kind of 
channel is that the actions of the associations generate an eviction effect on the rights 
delegation process from members to agencies and, by consequence, on their implication 
on the social space functioning (see Figure 17). 
 
So, for example, from P4 we could infer the following: 
P42:  In  caeteris  paribus  conditions,  as  lower  are  the  ideological  and  motivational 
heterogeneity, as stronger will be the relative social power of negotiating agencies and 
parallel agencies relative to the agency, and by consequence, as limited will be its 
interfering capacity in the afferent social space. 
So, the homogenous paradigmatic societies landscape is characterized by the existence 
of some agencies that are forced to action rather “persuasively” and “consensually” 
relative  to  associations,  clients  and  non-members,  and  also  is  characterized  by  the 
existence  of  a  wide  range  of  associations  which  are  able  to  determine  the 
(re)distribution of a large share of the social output and to assure the exerting of a large 
volume of rights to their specific members. 
An unclear aspect of the adopted presentation manner is connected with the existence of 
some  possible  feedback  connections  between  the  agency/the  associations  and  the 
components  of  the  intra-cultural  heterogeneity.  So,  a  legitimate  question  could  be   26 
formulated as follows: which is the impact of durable institutional entities on cultural 
values shared by the members of one society? 
 
In fact, this question contains two complementary problems: 1) the nature of cultural 
variables; 2) the institutional durability.  
 
1) As mentioned before, we consider the paradigm as representing “something much 
more” then a set of “shared values”. This way, one could remark that an interesting 
definition for the culture as “shared values” is, for instance, the definition given in 
KROEBER and KLUCKHOHN [1952] (cited by ADLER [1986]). According to this, 
culture  consist  of  patterns,  explicit  and  implicit  of  and  for  behaviors  acquired  and 
transmitted  by  symbols,  constituting  the  distinctive  achievement  of  human  groups, 
including  their  embodiment  in  artifacts;  the  essential  core  of  culture  consists  of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on 
the other as conditioning elements of future action. 
 
Culture is: 
-  Something that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group; 
-  Something  that  the  older  members  of  the  group  try  to  pass  on  to  the  younger 
members; and, 
-  Something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behavior, or 
structures one’s perception of the world. 
Our vision is much closer to HOFSTEDE [1991] who defines culture as “the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from another”. Like him, we emphasize that culture is, at least partially, learned, 
and not only inherited. 
Or,  if  this  hypothesis  is  a  valid  one,  then  the  agencies  and  the  associations  could 
influence the cultural variables by actions orientated towards modifying their relative 
positions inside the paradigm or by introduction of new variables. Sure, such influence 
is possible just in a sufficient temporal interval, but it is essential the fact that such 
interval could be one “intra-generational”. 
 
2) If it is necessary a “significant” temporal interval for an institutional entity to may 
action on cultural variables, then, for such interaction to take place, it is necessary that 
this entity to be durable, meaning to have a minimal functioning during this temporal 
interval.  But  it  is  not  clear  enough  what  are  the  “stability  conditions”  for 
associations/agencies. Sure, one could reason in a similar manner with the one utilized 
for deriving the “stability conditions” for the “social contract”. Although, there is an 
essential  difference,  difference  which  derives  from  the  necessity  to  make  a 
differentiation between temporary delegation and permanent delegation. So, individual 
social subjects may transfer the exertion of their “natural” or “achieved” rights for a 
limited period of time (they may formulate a “limited temporary mandate”) for reaching 
some specific objectives with a time-deadline or they may choose to give a “perpetual” 
mandate  to  the  principal  (without  a  predefined  time-deadline).  So,  the  institutional 
entities  generated  by  these  two  types  of  delegation  acts  could  be  “temporal”  or 
“perpetual”  institutions.  It  must  be  remarked  that  the  manner  of  presenting  of  the 
agency’s forming and actions is less compatible with the model of the mandate with a 
time-deadline:  the  agencies  tend  to  overtake  “permanently”  the  exertion  of  theirs 
clients’  rights  and  to  enforce,  by  formulating  a  standardized  “social  contract”,  this 
overtaking. In exchange, it is possible (although it is not sure that this is “the rule”) that 
the negotiating associations to disappear after reaching their objectives, and parallel   27 
association  which  have  an  efficiency  level  inferior  to  that  of  the  agency  could  be 
competitively eliminated. In the same time, the agencies have large dimensions and 
their impact on the paradigm is a large one, given by the capacity to influence a large 
number of individual social subjects. In exchange, the associations could influence only 
a limited number of the members of the society; the induced paradigm “variations” 
could only coagulate in subcultures. 
 
So: 
P5: The agencies tend to be “durable” institutional entities and, by consequence could 
exercise  a  significant  influence  on  the  ensemble  of  paradigmatic  architecture.  In 
exchange,  only  a  part  of  the  associations  have  a  “durable”  character  and  their 
influence on the paradigm is limited to its component subcultures.  
By consequence, it is necessary to modify Figure 17 in the sense from Figure 18, to 
reflect the ambivalent temporary connections between institutional entities and cultural 
variables. 
 
Stating  the  existence  of  a  temporal  “reaction”  interval  “long  enough”  for  the 
components  of  the  paradigm  to  react  at  agencies/associations  behavior,  generate  a 
severe limitation for the explanatory capacity of this analysis because doesn’t imply the 
mechanisms  which  sustain  a  “long-term  institutional  memory”,  memory  which  is 
necessary for cultural conditioning of both the agencies’/associations’ personnel and 
their  members.  Alternatively,  we  could  presume  that  the  change  of  paradigmatic 
architecture results “spontaneously” from the actions undertaken by these institutional 
entities  in  the  pursuit  of  the  objectives  from  their  current  agenda.  And,  for  such 
explanatory  versions  to  be  considered,  it  is  necessary  to  clarify  the  transmission 
channels of such “spontaneous” effects. 
So, if the presented analytical framework legitimately permits to derive a “one way” 
connection  from  paradigm’s  components  to  associations  and  agencies¸  it  does  not 
permit a proper argumentation of  the “inverse” chain reaction, despite the fact that, in 
the same time, the impossibility of its existence it is not suggested.  
 
Revising, the version of the mandate theory proposed in this analysis, based on some 
“visible/invisible hand” mechanisms (combined with “social contract” theory), consist 
in a set of five postulates and a definition of the paradigm from which is derived an 
“extended” definition of the state as a dominant agency, and also a definition of the 
other institutional entities that regroup their clients and non-members. 
 
P0:  Each  social  subject  has  an  identical  set  of  “natural  rights”,  but  with  unequal 
capacity of exerting them. 
 
P1: To maximize the derived utility from its “natural rights”, a social subject X, could 
choose to commission a fraction of these, x, to another subject Y, which has a superior 
capacity of exerting delegated rights, and correlatively, to share with him a fraction C 
from the output generated by this exertion. 
 
2 P : A social subject X can decide the complete or partial delegation of exerting an 
achieved  right  towards  another  subject  Y  if  the  output  of  this  delegation  ( ) x a ,  is 
superior to the highest of the results derived from exerting his own right  ( ) x b  and 
respectively,  giving  it  in  (together  with  the  corresponding  right  of  exerting)  for  a 
“price” ( ) x p , in exchange of a fraction d of the total resulted output. 
   28 
P3:  From  left  to  right  of  the  societal  spectrum  (from  closed  to  open  societies)  is 
registered: a reduction of the “level” and “intensity” of the processes of “natural” and 
“achieved”  rights  delegation,  forming  mechanisms  of  the  agencies  based  on 
“competitive” elimination, a reducing of the associations’ dimensions, a prevalence of 
the  parallel  associations  comparing  with  negotiation  associations,  a  reduction  of 
preventive  compensation,  a  reduced  standardization  of  the  “social  contract”,  a 
formalization of the  clauses that aim at social performance and social subjects liberties 
preservation, and a passing from social negotiations aiming at reaching a consensus to 
“competitive” social negotiations. 
 
P4: In caeteris paribus conditions, the dynamic of two distinct social spaces it will be 
differentiated by the intra-cultural heterogeneity which characterize their paradigmatic 
configuration: as higher is this heterogeneity, as more the forming and evolution of the 
agencies will be strongly dominated by actions of “competitive elimination” / violent 
actions, as smaller will be the associations and higher will be both their homogeneity 
and  the  degree  of  social  openness.  More,  as  higher  will  be  the  relative  level  of 
ideological heterogeneity, as lower will be both the number and the relative impact of 
negotiation associations. 
 
P5: The agencies tend to be “durable” institutional entities and, by consequence could 
exercise  a  significant  influence  on  the  ensemble  of  paradigmatic  architecture.  In 
exchange,  only  a  part  of  the  associations  have  a  “durable”  character  and  their 
influence on the paradigm is limited to its component subcultures. 
 
D6:  Through  paradigm  we  understand  the  dominant  collective  mental  model  that 
individualizes a society from another. This paradigm represents a societal integration 
factor, by offering common values and goals for the members of the society. Also, this 
represents the subject of some learning and inter-generational transmission process, 
which slowly modifies itself, in “long cycles”. 
 
D7:  “The  state”  represents  the  macro-agency  or  the  dominant  agency  of  exerting 
“natural” and “achieved” rights, overtaken from social subjects from certain territory, 
formed by voluntary association of a number of individual agencies or as a result of 
some violent actions against other agencies, against their clients or against own clients, 
which could limit by effects and temporarily any breaking of its monopoly by other 
existing or virtual entities, and which is authorized by its clients, for preventive goals, to 
action in a re-distributive manner for the non-members. The framework in which the 
relations between this agency and the social subjects take place forms the substance of 
“social  contract”.  This  derives  from  the  standardization  of  individual  contracts 
negotiated  with  clients  and  non-members,  which  represents  a  “conglomerate”  of 
contracts including symmetrical and non-symmetrical “clauses” in relation with the 
preventive compensation and the “standard packages” of services offered for exerting 
of  the  “natural  rights”,  respectively  “non-standard  packages”  for  exerting  the 
“achieved  rights”.  For  the  renegotiation  of  some  individual  clauses  of  the  “social 
contract” or for the parallel exerting of some of their rights, the clients and/or non-
members could group in negotiation associations / parallel associations which have a 
optimal social scale in a zone defined by the necessity of assuring the negotiating power 
/ the control on a “sufficient” fraction of the social resources, and by the necessity of 
the preservation of the efficiency of the participation for its members, and of the choice 
for a competitive / non-competitive position in respect to the dominant agency. The 
existence of these associations is ethically justified if their object of activity is connected 
with the exertion of the “natural rights’ and represents a subject of social recognition   29 
both by the agency’s clients, directly or through it, and by the non-members, which, 
ethically speaking, could  accept or refuse  their  existence if the object of activity  is 
related with the exertion of “achieved rights” and which could state the conditions of 
their action performing. The ensemble of strategic alliances / force relations between 
the  agency  and  the macro-associations  or  individual  association  defines  the  social 
space’s frontier. For the social subject from the new generation, the agency appears as 
a given reality, they having the possibility to join the standardized “social contract”, to 
choose for the non-member state, and to form new associations and to participate to 
existing  associations,  founded  by  the  past  generations,  for  the  renegotiating  of  the 
clauses  that  are  not  corresponding  anymore  to  the  new  specific  social  context.  In 
caeteris paribus conditions, the formation mechanisms, the taxonomy and the agendas 
of the agencies/associations from two social spaces will be different, influenced by the 
level of the component variables of the dominant cultural paradigms from these spaces, 
and  by  the  intra-cultural  heterogeneity  components.  Between  the  paradigm  and  the 
agencies / associations exists both “direct” connections and “inverse” connection that 
are taking place in “long enough” temporal horizons. 
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Figure 1: The „net” output of delegation for „natural rights” 
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Figure 2: The “net” output of delegation for “social rights” 
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Figure 3: The „net” output of delegation for „natural and social rights” 
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Figure 4: The existence conditions for an agencie between Y and Z  
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Note: This not take into account the existence of some possible costs of information about Z encountered by X. 
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Figure 5: The existence conditions for an „association” of agencies 
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Figure 6: The conditions for demanding an „association” between agencies 
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Figure 7: The  1 X agreement for a redistributive policy 
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Figure 8: The  NM X  agreement for a redistributive policy 
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where J  reflects the associated costs of  NM X  subjects intentions to appropriate the 
agency’s output. 
 
Figure 9: The conditions for the “social contract” stability 
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Figure 10: The conditions for the agency „optimal” dimensions 
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Figure 11: The conditions for the participation in an association 
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where a index represents  the „production functions ” and the parameters specific to the 
associations. 
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Figure 12: The negotiation conditions 
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Note: Whithout taking into account the effective negotiation costs. 
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Figure 13: Associations scale and output per member 
 
 




























Figure 15: The characteristic of the different paradigms 
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Figure 16: From close to open societies 
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Figure 18: Intra-cultural heterogeneity, associations and agency: “short” and 











              “Short time” influences 
             “Short time” influences 













Parallel associations  
Agency 